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During the election campaign to the State Duma of the Russian Federation, the following aspects should be further supported and taken into account when forming a position on the legitimacy of voting results:
the pro-government “United Russia” party has no real popularity in Russian society. Even the inclusion of "popular" S.Shoigu and S.Lavrov, who are the key ideologists and implementers of Putin's aggressive policy of “forceful diplomacy”, to the top five of the party's list does not strengthen confidence in it;
taking into account the low level of trust to the ruling party, the Kremlin has chosen the most primitive way – to organize a campaign of bribing voters on the eve of the election race. According to some estimates, this will affect almost half of Russian voters, which will make the ongoing bribery campaign in Russia one of the largest dirty campaigns in the world. At the same time, material preferences will be provided mainly to representatives of Putin's basic electorate in the form of one-time payments to families with children, pensioners, and officers of "power block". Similar manipulative steps were taken by the Russian authorities on the eve of last year's vote on amendments to the Constitution of the Russian Federation;
the need for large-scale voter bribery campaigns shows that Putin's "moral support" of the ruling party alone is not enough to obtain sufficient electoral results. This questions the real level of trust to the President of the Russian Federation, dissolves myths about his personal popularity or the support by Russian society of the crimes which the Kremlin has committed in Ukraine and other countries;
even in the conditions of total "cleansing" of the electoral field and media space from pluralism of opinion, criminalization of the activities of opponents to the Russian state power, closure of opposition media and public organizations, the Kremlin is unable to offer the Russian society a platform and constructive ideas for state development and modernization , which could be supported by voters, and relies only on intimidation, large-scale bribery and falsification;
taking into account the high probability of destabilization of the socio-political situation in Russia and the deployment of civil strife due to the expected large-scale falsification during the upcoming elections in Russia, significant funds are allocated for the needs of "guards" of the Kremlin regime – the salaries of military personnel and departments "power block" were raised. Significant financial infusions and other incentives are also conditioned due to the critical attitude of the "power block" to last year's "constitutional reform" in Russia and the Kremlin regime as a whole.